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Abstract

Conventional wisdom would have us believe that the Bush v.
Gore (2000) decision marked a large change in public approval of
the Supreme Court.

To analyze this claim, a series of landmark

cases for the years 2000-2010 will be reduced to a data set that
will allow for the observation of specific variables and the
roles each variable may play in determining the change in public
opinion. From there, conclusions are made that substantively
explicate the relations between the indicated relevant variables
and the change in opinion.

Ultimately, the Bush v. Gore

decision is found to have not had the major effect on public
approval that conventional wisdom would have us believe.
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INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the millennium, the nation found itself in
the middle of a very heated presidential election.

Would the

Republican candidate George W. Bush take control of the house or
would the Democrat Al Gore win the nation over.
the nation?

Who would lead

As November 7th came and went, America still did not

have an answer to this question.

The state of Florida had

awarded the presidency to Bush.

The victory, however, was by

less than a margin of 0.5 percent, which brought about a
statutorily-mandated recount of the votes.

Then, as the recount

returned with Bush winning by only 327 votes, Gore took
advantage of Florida election law allowing him to demand a
manual recount.

On November 26, Florida Secretary of State

Katherine Harris announced Bush as the official winner and
litigation immediately ensued to contest the declaration and the
need for a recount.
Before long, the United States Supreme Court would weigh in
on the issue and find itself in the middle of an extremely
controversial case.

The judicial branch of the government had

declared itself the supreme decider on the issue our nation’s
president-elect.

Just one day after hearing oral argument, the

Court reached a conclusion.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court found

the recount requested by Gore to be unconstitutional and stopped
it from happening.

As the gavel slammed, the media erupted.
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The nine justices at the head of the judicial branch of the
United States had, for all practical purposes, decided the
presidential election of 2000.
The media erupted, but how did the American people react?
Public opinion polls, used to gauge the public’s feelings toward
specific issues, groups, etc., reported a 3 percent drop in the
approval rating of the Supreme Court.

To be sure, 3 percent is

no insignificant drop, but was it the monumental dive in
approval that people associate with the case?

It would appear

that, contrary to the amount of attention the media gave the
issue, Americans did not allow the decision to affect their
approval rating of the Court much more than they did when the
Court decided on the detention of enemy combatants in Hamdi v.
Rusmfield (2004).

In fact, prior to and since this poll there

have been a number of instances of approval decreasing much more
dramatically than 3 percent.

In some instances, public approval

ratings of the Court had dropped a stunning 9 percent.
While it is impossible to pinpoint exactly what constituted
these dramatic changes in approval throughout the period of
2000-2010, a number of factors may have made their own
contribution to these changes.

For instance, approval of the

court plummeted from 51 percent to a low of 42 percent by the
end of June 2005.

In June of that year, the Court had decided a

number of hot-button issues including reversing a man’s murder
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conviction, overturning another man’s death sentence, and
declaring Congress’ right to ban medical marijuana regardless of
state laws.

Also, the day before the public opinion polling

took place, the Court handed down what has been called one of
the most controversial decisions of that session, if not all
time, Kelo v. City of New London (2005).

This decision made it

constitutionally permissible for the government to seize private
property against the will of the owner and transfer it to
private developers when the result of such a seizure will lead
to economic development for said community.
Did the Bush v. Gore decision really impact public opinion
of the Court as greatly as conventional wisdom would have us
believe?

It seems that is not the case.

There have been a

number of occasions between 2000 and 2010 that appear to have
impacted the prestige of the Court in a greater way than this
particular decision did.

An analysis of specific variables

(described in greater detail in the Research Design Plan) of the
most salient decisions handled by the Court from 2000-2010 will
allow us to explore more deeply the effects of different
circumstances on the public approval of the Court. Some of these
specific variables are controlling party of the Senate,
presidential party, the issue type for each case, and whether or
not the case overturns past precedent.
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RESEARCH DESIGN PLAN
Focusing on the Bush v. Gore decision, I will determine how
great an impact, if any, a particular decision had on the
public’s approval of the Court.

To do this, I will compare the

public approval rating immediately following the Bush v. Gore
decision to the public opinion ratings following other cases
that are particularly salient to the American people.

Case Selection
First, a list of issues were chosen that peaked the
interest of the American people.

These issues were chosen

because they were determined to most affect the approval ratings
of the Court.

Cornell University, which currently maintains a

database of the Supreme Court decisions by term, offers a
collection of what it calls the “highlight decisions” of each
term. I have made this the basis for my collection of cases.
The cases that made the list used in this particular analysis
had to, at a minimum, be mentioned as one of the highlight
decisions for that term as developed by Cornell University (2).
The following topics were considered to be salient to the
American people and allowed me to narrow down the number of
cases that may have had the most significant impact on the
polling data:
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Abortion
Homosexuality
Criminal Rights
Civil Rights
States’ Rights
Commerce Clause
Federal Agent
Environment
Immigration
Free Speech
Note: Presented in no particular order
Making use of the Cornell highlights offers a reducible,
valid, and transferrable method of measure for issue salience.
This standard can be used for replication and/or further study
of these specific variables.

Public Opinion Data – Unit of Observation
To gauge the public’s approval of the Supreme Court, Gallup
Incorporated has collected data from the public 18 times since
2000.

Gallup asked a random sample of the American population

the following question:

“Do you approve or disapprove of the

way the Supreme Court is handling its job?”

The respondents,

averaging n=1,000 per poll, were instructed to answer in one of
three ways: approve, disapprove, or don’t know.

The surveys

were conducted by telephone using random-digit-dial sampling and
limited to U.S. citizens of age 18 or older (3). This data will
serve as the basis for my comparisons and conclusions regarding
the effect specific decisions and/or entire terms had on public
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approval of the Supreme Court.

The unit of analysis will be the

random sampling of the American people, and the unit of
observation will be the approval ratings of the Supreme Court by
respondents.
Gallup Incorporated has been recognized as one of the
premier public opinion data collection agencies and has been
used in many reputable publications including the New York Times
as well as the Wall Street Journal.

The reputation of Gallup

polling has allowed me to feel confident in using their data as
my main point of analysis.

I will compare the decision dates to

the dates of the polls to attempt to understand which decisions
played a role in each particular poll’s results.

For instance,

if a decision had been handed down from the Court on June 23,
2005, as was the decision for the Kelo v. City of New London
case regarding eminent domain, and a public opinion poll had
been taken on June 24-26, 2005, the resulting approval rating of
the Court at that time could be a result of that recently
announced decision, and the analysis would approach the issue in
such a manner.
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Date
August 29 - September 5
January 10 - January 14
June 11- June 17
September 7 - September 10
September 5 - September 8
July 7 - July 9
September 8 - September 10
September 13- September 15
June 24- June 26
September 12 - September 15
September 7- September 10
May 10 - May 13
September 14 - September 16
June 9 - June 12
September 8 - September 11
June 14- June 17
August 31 - September 2

Approve (%)
62
59
62
58
60
59
52
51
42
56
60
51
51
48
50
59
61

Disapprove (%)
29
34
25
28
29
33
38
39
48
36
32
36
39
38
39
30
28

No Opinion (%)
9
7
13
14
11
8
10
10
10
8
8
13
10
14
11
11
11

2010 September 13 - September 16

51

39

10

2000
2001
2001
2001
2002
2003
2003
2004
2005
2005
2006
2007
2007
2008
2008
2009
2009

Table A - "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Supreme
Court is handling its job?" – Gallup, Inc. MoE ± 4 n! 1,000

Figure 1 - The same information presented in a line graph.
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Hypothesis
Once the cases were selected, each case had to be broken
down into categories for a deeper analysis.

Multiple factors

were believed to have affected the prestige of the court.

These

factors included:
Issues – It is expected that the most important factor in
determining the mean effect of each decisions on the approval of
the Court will be issues.

Certain types of issues the Court

decides on, it is believed, speak more directly to the public
and can incite a lot of discussion and/or change in the feelings
the public has of the Court. This variable will allow us to
break the cases down to what category of issues they fell in to.
President’s Party (PresPart) – The party of the president
at the time the decision was handed down may have affected the
public’s view of the Supreme Court.
Up to 1 Year After Presidential Election (PPE1y) - It is
important to look for patterns in change in approval of the
Supreme Court following presidential elections because it may be
the case that approval of the Court is a function of a recent
upheaval in the amount of attention the American public is
paying to politics.

Typically, the presidential election year

brings added attention to politics and being more informed may
play a role in approval. The timeframe of one year is equivalent
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to " the term length of the president.

Beyond that, people may

begin to become disinterested in politics again after this
amount of time, if they haven’t already.
Up to 6 Months After Mid-Term Election (PME6m) – Much like
the timeframe of the variable above, 6 months is the time limit
that has been granted before political apathy spreads among the
American people.

Again, during congressional elections we find

that the attention paid to politics is higher than non-election
times.

For these reasons, it is important to search for any

patterns that may occur in change in approval following
congressional elections.
Unanimous Decision (UnaDec) – Perhaps it is the case that
the overall agreement of the nine justices plays a role in
shaping approval for the Court.

For instance, does a 5-4

decision give more support to a change in approval than, say, a
9-0 decision?

Unanimity among the nine justices may indicate to

the public that the issue was decided on a non-partisan law
basis.

Whatever the actual psychological effect, it will be

helpful to discover if a unanimous decision preceding an
approval poll actually has any effect.
Senate Majority Party (SenMaj) – This variable refers to
the party that has majority control of the Senate at the time
the decision is handed down, unless the decision came down after
a congressional election.

It is important to take into account
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the time of the election because it may indicate a change in the
political thoughts of the American people.

Are the approval

ratings of the Supreme Court likely to be higher or lower in
times of Republican rule in the Senate?

Questions like these

can be answered with an appeal to this variable.
House Majority Party (HousMaj) – As with the Senate, this
variable refers to the party holding the most seats at the time
the decision is handed down, unless of course the decision is
handed down immediately following an election, but prior to the
inauguration date of the new Congress (January 3rd).

In cases

where this is applicable, the majority party shall be considered
the party that will hold the most seats on the date of
inauguration.
Divided Congress (DivCon) – Is there a different party in
the majority in the House of Representatives than there is in
the Senate?

Does a divided Congress correlate to a decrease or

increase in the approval rating of the Supreme Court?
President and Congress Divided (PCDiv) – Is the party that
controls the presidency the same party that commands a majority
in Congress?
Democrat?

If not, is the president a Republican or a

Does it matter?

Overturn Previous Case (OvrTrn) – Are we more likely to see
a change in public approval rating if the decision overturns
past precedent?

Do Americans have an affinity for the doctrine
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of Stare Decisis?

This variable is designed to consider the

possible effect of such sentiments.
Opinion Author – Appointing Party (OpAuthRD) – What party
was the president that nominated the Justice that wrote the
opinion?

Does this partisan aspect of the Supreme Court play a

role in America’s feelings toward the Supreme Court?

Are

approval ratings better immediately following decisions handed
down by Democratic nominees, or is the Court better off
assigning the decision writing to Republican nominees?
Actual Approval Rating Before and After
(Poll_Pre)(Poll_Post) – These variable will simply represent the
percentage of the respondents who offered the response of
“approve” in the poll immediately preceding and following each
decision. The change in approval will be looked at in terms of
absolute value, as well as in terms of negative or positive
depending on its application to specific variables (See Effect).

It is expected that the Bush v. Gore decision (2000) did
not have the dramatic effect on public approval for the Supreme
Court that seems would intuitively follow given the nature of
the decision.

In comparison to other cases between the years

2000 and 2010, the Bush v. Gore decision had, relatively
speaking, a small effect on the prestige of the Supreme Court.
Varying factors including issues, House and Senate majority
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leading parties, the party of the president, overturning of
previous cases, unanimity of the decision, was Congress divided,
were the president and Congress led by the same party, and which
party appointed the author of the opinion all play a role in
determining the public approval rating of the Supreme Court
following some of their major decisions. Further examination of
these variables and their effects is necessary to support this
conclusion.
Throughout this thesis, I will explore the effects that the
decisions made by the Supreme Court between the years 2000 and
2010 had on the public approval rating of the Court. In
addition, explanations for what circumstances may have brought
about these changes in approval rating will be identified and
further explicated.
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Methods

With the data broken down into the multiple variables, the
next step is to do a basic analysis to determine which case
appeared to have the greatest impact on the approval rating.
After that, it becomes a matter of doing a similar type of
analysis for each variable.

Determining the issue most likely

to cause the greatest change in public approval is a very
intriguing question that may lead to a very surprising answer.
By separating the variables and comparing the means of variables
against one another, we can determine which variable plays a
greater role in determining approval rating.

Eventually, the

variable most likely to play the largest role in determining
public approval will prevail. From there, certain variables can
be controlled for to determine the strength of their
predictability.

In the end, it may even be the case that only

one or two variables actually play a large role in determining
the change in public approval. If this is so, this study will
elaborate only on those variables that are significant to the
study.
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Polling Data and Context
Before diving into the complex details of some of the more
salient cases, it will be helpful to understand the range of
public approval ratings for the Supreme Court starting with the
year 2000.

In August 29, 2000, Gallup, Inc. began polling a

random sample of roughly 1,000 Americans asking "Do you approve
or disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job?"
Respondents to the questions were given the options of approve,
disapprove, or unsure.

The polling was closed on September 5,

2000, and the results showed that 62 percent of Americans
approved of the way the Supreme Court was handling its job at
that time.

Since that poll, the Supreme Court has only once

been found to have such high approval rating, and it didn’t last
long.
Throughout the next few years, the approval rating for the
Supreme Court would bounce around between 62 percent and 58
percent, but it didn’t drop below that.

Then, in a term in

which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a number of cases
involving hot-button issues including homosexuality, affirmative
action, and cross burning as a form of speech, the Court saw its
first major drop in approval in the new millennium.

Results of

a poll taken just months after the court handed down some of
these controversial decisions, the approval rating of the Court
sank to 52 percent.
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Surprisingly, 52 percent wasn’t the lowest approval rating
the Court reached between 2000 and 2010.

Just two terms later,

the Court would again find itself handing down some of its more
controversial decisions including cases involving white collar
crime following the Enron mishap, issues of intellectual
property and downloading of files illegally, as well as the
right of Congress to control the use of medical marijuana.
Gonzales v. Raich (2005), the case in which the Court affirmed
the authority of the federal government in controlling the
growth, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes,
was quickly followed up twenty days later by another poll of the
American people that indicated that approval of the Court’s
handling of its job had plummeted to an all-decade low of 42
percent.
Since then, the Court has not seen a return to the high
levels of public approval it had at the turn of the millennium
with 62 percent.

To be sure, however, the Court has not seen a

return to the dismal low of 42 percent, either.

In analyzing

these facts, however, it may be important to better understand
what it is that the 9 justices of the Supreme Court are deciding
on in some of these controversial cases.

The following cases

are used to exemplify the types of issues and details that
brought about the greatest changes from 2000-2010
(See Figure 2).
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Case Studies: Salient Cases 2000-2010

When approaching an analysis of the affects of a case like
Bush v. Gore on the public approval of the Supreme Court and
comparing its effect to that of other controversial decisions of
the same decade, it is important to have an understanding of
what Bush v. Gore was about.
the nine black robes?
answer?
decision?

What were the facts presented to

What were the exact questions they had to

What was the actual, substantive result of their
Once these questions are answered about a number of

different cases, we can move to a larger picture understanding
of the approval of the Court throughout the decade.

Case Analysis: Bush v. Gore (2000)

The idea of one person, one vote is merely a myth in
America when it comes to presidential elections.

As many are

well aware, the American vote is not a vote for that particular
candidate, at least not directly.

No, the vote is for a slate

of “electors” who have pledged to vote for a particular
candidate for president.
as the Electoral College.

These electors are collectively known
It used to be the case that State

legislatures would directly appoint the Electoral College, but
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many states, including Florida, have moved to select the College
by popular vote.

The state of Florida awards all of the votes

of the Electoral College to the candidate that receives a
plurality (greatest number) of votes. Article II, § 1, cl. 2 .
The candidate who receives an absolute majority of the votes of
the Electoral College is announced the winner of the
Presidential election.
By a lead of 2,909,135 votes to 2,907,351 votes, the
Florida Division of Elections on November 8, 2000 reported that
Governor Bush had led in total number of votes for Presidential
election.

In accordance with §102.141 of the election code, a

mandatory machine recount was conducted because of the margin of
victory was less than 0.5 percent.

The recount again revealed

Governor Bush as the winner of the popular vote, but by an even
smaller margin than the initial count.

When then Al Gore called

for manual recounts in four Florida counties a challenge was
made over the deadline by which time the local county canvassing
boards had to meet to submit their findings to the Secretary of
State.

The Florida Supreme Court, reacting to the Secretary of

State’s refusal to move the November 14th deadline, ordered the
deadline to be November 26th to allow for ample time for
recounts.

Yet again, when the new deadline of November 26th

came, the board declared Governor Bush the winner of Florida’s
electoral votes.
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After a series of challenges to the election results from
Gore, the Florida Supreme Court held that the burden of proof
that Gore had to meet under §102.168(3)(c) of the election code
was sufficiently met by his argument that Miami-Dade County had
failed to detect some 9,000 votes, which came to be known as
“undervotes.”

As a result, the Supreme Court of Florida ordered

a manual recount of the Miami-Dade County votes.

Immediately,

Governor Bush filed for an emergency application for a stay of
the mandate of the Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme

Court granted the application for the stay, treated said
application as a petition for a writ of certiorari, and granted
certiorari on December 9, 2000.

The petitioner, George Bush,

argued that the Florida Supreme Court, by establishing new
standards for resolving Presidential election contests, violated
Art. II, §1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution.

In

addition to this claim, Bush argued that the use of manual
recounts without a set standard, as was the case in Miami-Dade
County, constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as it is applied to the equality of
a citizen’s vote.

Interestingly enough, the respondent, Al

Gore, bases much of his argument on the Equal Protection clause
as well, citing it as justification for the recounts to ensure
that each person’s vote is counted toward the presidential
election.
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The problem of counting votes stems from the difficulty in
discerning the “intent of the voter” on each ballot.

The ballot

cards are designed so that the button a voter pushes forces a
stylus to pierce the card next to the name of the candidate for
whom they wish to vote.

Occasionally, the stylus fails to

pierce the whole completely and, in other circumstances, does
little more than leave an indent on the card.

According to the

per curiam opinion of the Court, a study revealed that something
around 2 percent of ballots cast in a presidential election do
not actually register a vote. (1.1 and 1.2).

In some instances,

the ballot had been pierced but any number of corners of the
punched hole may still be attached to the ballot.

These came to

be known as “hanging chads.”
A 5-4 decision, handed down in the form of a per curiam
opinion (meaning no particular justice authored the opinion and
instead it is a representation of the majority view as a whole),
declaring the acts of the Florida Supreme Court requiring the
manual recount of any number of the ballots using the standard
of “the intent of the voter” was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

To further

convey that the risk of differing standards from county to
county, let alone individual counter to individual counter was
too great, the Court cites testimony that “A monitor in MiamiDade County testified at trial that he observed that three
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members of the county canvassing board applied different
standards in defining a legal vote.” 3 Tr. 497, 499 (Dec. 3,
2000).

In addition, further testimony revealed “at least one

county changed its evaluative standards DURING the counting
process.” (Emphasis Added).

If the state is to require manual

recounts of votes, says the opinion, there must, at a minimum,
be some assurance of fundamental fairness and equal treatment
when counting the votes on the ballots.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist (joined by
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) argued the recount ordered by
the Florida Supreme Court was unconstitutional because the
decision effectively created new election law, a duty assigned
exclusively to the legislature.

Just like that, the Supreme

Court, the head of the judicial branch of our government,
decided the presidential election of the United States of
America.

For many, the Court overstepped its bounds and handed

down an obviously politically charged decision.

For others,

this was merely a particularly difficult question of law for
which the justice never asked for.

It is their duty to answer

these types of questions, and so they did.

24

The Bush v. Gore decision, which is commonly referred to as
the most controversial decision of the Court’s history, resulted
in what looks like only a small loss in approval when compared
to that of the Gonzales v. Raich decision of 2005, the effect of
which will be explained in the results section.

What factors of

this case could have brought about this dive in approval?

To

better understand that, it is important to understand the case
itself and what the judges had to decide.

Case Analysis: Gonzales v. Raich (2005)

Long before any of us can remember, Emperor Shen Neng of
China prescribed tea as a remedy for things like gout,
rheumatism, and malaria.

The tea he proscribed in 2737 B.C.

happened to be made with the leaves of Cannabis sativa, more
commonly referred to as marijuana.

From China, the drugs

popularity quickly spread to all of Asia, the Middle East, and
Africa.

Doctors from these continents readily proscribed

marijuana for a number of remedies (4).

Fast forward a couple

thousand years and Christopher Columbus is toting marijuana with
him on his voyage to America, thus the introduction to North
America.

In 1619, a law is passed in Jamestown, Virginia

requiring farmers to grow the hemp plant, a variant of cannabis
sativa (5).

Early American medical journals of the late 18th
25

century recommend use of the hemp plant for illnesses like
incontinence, venereal diseases, and inflamed skin.
did marijuana go wrong?

So where

If so many physicians are proscribing

it for medicinal benefit to people all around the world, why is
it that the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes is illegal
today?
In 1914, the Harrison Act was passed which was the first
time the use of any drugs had been considered a crime, but
marijuana was still not criminalized.

It wasn’t until 1937 when

America saw 23 states had made it a crime to use marijuana
regardless of the intended purpose.

For some states, this was a

preventative move to stop those addicted to morphine from simply
switching to another form of narcotic once the use of morphine
was criminalized.

For other states, particularly those near the

Mexican border, marijuana laws were enacted as a means of
control over the migrant population coming from Mexico who were
blamed for bringing more of the drug into the country.

By the

1950s, the Boggs Act and the Narcotics Control Act were passed
by Congress, which instated mandatory sentences for those
convicted of drug related offenses.

In similar fashion, the

infamous “War on Drugs” campaign was started by the Reagan
administration in 1969.
When Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, they classified marijuana as
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a Schedule I drug under Title II of the Act, also referred to as
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Placing marijuana under
Schedule I effectively criminalized any and all uses of
marijuana, with the exception of that of studies conducted under
the approval of the Food and Drug Administration. According to
the most recent version of the CSA, Schedule I substances are
labeled as such because:

(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for
abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug
or other substance under medical supervision.
(6)
More recently, there appears to be a move toward a
relaxation of anti-marijuana laws and enforcement of the same.
As of today, 15 states and Washington, D.C.

have some form of

legalized medicinal marijuana, despite the federal law against
its use (7).

Many American people have resorted to marijuana

as an effective relief from chronic pain and other sever
illnesses. In 1996, California blazed trails by passing
Proposition 215, now referred to as the Compassionate Use Act, a
law permitting the use of medical marijuana under specified
circumstances.

Following the passing of the act, Angel Raich

and Diane Monson began to use medical marijuana by
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recommendation and prescription of their doctors, both of whom
were licensed, board-certified family practitioners in the state
of California.

The doctors of both women had tried a myriad of

different medications to treat their patients’ conditions and
found that only marijuana proved to be effective.
On August 15, 2002, Diane Monson was surprised when she
opened the door to see county deputy sheriffs and agents of the
federal Drug Enforcement Agency standing before her.

Following

a thorough investigation of the home, the county officers found
that Monson, who had not been selling or buying the drugs, was
in full compliance with California law when it came to her use
of marijuana.

Within three hours of this declaration by the

county officials, federal agents had removed and destroyed all
of Monson’s marijuana plants citing a violation of federal law
as enacted by the CSA.
Following this incident, Diane Monson and Angel Raich (who
shall be referred to jointly as “Raich”) sued the DEA and U.S.
Attorney General Ashcroft (later Gonzales) in federal court
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act.

In the complaint,

Raich cited violations of the 10th Amendment and of Article I
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, better known as the Commerce
Clause.

Raich argued that their actions were wholly intrastate

(within the borders of the state, and making use of products
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manufactured and delivered completely within the state of
California) and thus not subject to the control of Congress,
which has expressed power to control interstate commerce (that
between two or more states).

Raich’s complaint argues that it

is a constitutional imperative that the federal government, in
consistency with our federal system wherein States retain their
rights as governing bodies, be precluded from controlling
commerce that is wholly intrastate.

Raich goes so far as to

claim that their actions were not commerce at all because they
neither bought nor sold the marijuana that they grew or had
grown for them by legal “caregivers.”
Furthermore, the complaint cited the doctrine of medical
necessity, which allows for the use of medical marijuana for
those people who have serious medical conditions, who will
suffer harm if denied medical marijuana, and for whom there is
no legal alternative to remedy their symptoms.

Although the

right to one’s body and personal choices therein is not
expressly stated in the Constitution, it is clearly a major part
of our nation’s history.

“The rights to bodily integrity, to

ameliorate pain, and to prolong life are…” the complaint argues,
”distinct rights or specific aspects of the famous trinity
‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ in the Declaration
of Independence (8).”

The complaint continues on to say that

the government has no compelling interest in denying

29

respondents, Raich, who were both very seriously ill patients,
these fundamental rights.
After being denied injunctive relief from the District
Court, Raich appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and got the District Court decision reversed and an
order to enter a preliminary injunction was submitted.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (2003).

Raich v.

Relying heavily on prior

Supreme Court cases including United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the
Court of Appeals stated that “the medicinal marijuana at issue
in this case [was] not intended for, nor [did] it enter, the
stream of commerce.”

The Court of Appeals did not, however,

make any ruling on the argument put forth in the complaint of
the medical necessity doctrine.
Following the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to the case citing the
“obvious importance” of the issue.

In the opinion of the Court,

Justice Stevens speaks of the challenges of this case due to the
strong argument that Raich makes that irreparable harm will be
suffered as a result of the actions of the government because,
despite the contradictory findings of congressional
investigation, marijuana does have some valid therapeutic
effects.

To be sure, the Court made clear its responsibilities

to the Constitution, the government, and the American people.
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The Court clearly states three categories over which
Congress has the authority to regulate under the Commerce
Clause.

First, Congress, as a result of Perez v. United States,

402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971), can legislate over the “channels of
interstate commerce.”

That is, Congress has the authority to

enforce legislation over any means by which commerce may become
interstate including highways, rivers, streams, walking paths,
etc..

Second, Congress is recognized as having the power to

regulate the “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce,
including any and all persons or things in interstate commerce.
Third, Congress shall have the authority to regulate those
things which can be seen to “substantially affect” interstate
commerce. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937).

It is under the umbrella of the third category that we

find application to the Raich decision.
A trail of case law led the Court to its decision in this
case.

Most notably, the case of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.

111, 128—129 (1942) offers some insight into the opinion handed
down from the Court.

Briefly described, the case of Wickard v.

Filburn is one in which a farmer, Filburn, grew and harvested 23
acres of wheat, despite the federal government’s cap of 11.1
acres for economic reasons.

Filburn argued that the federal

government’s regulation of his wheat production was
unconstitutional on the grounds that his wheat was produced
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solely for the purpose of consumption on his own farm and never
entered into the stream of commerce in any way.
Justice Jackson, in the Court’s opinion, stated, “even if
[Filburn’s] activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce.” Id., at 125.

While a de minimis approach

to the acts of Filburn may at first appear trivial, it is of the
Court’s opinion that his action in concert with others who may
be similarly situated is far from trivial.

In effect, the Court

declared that Congress does have the authority to regulate
intrastate activity that is not in the typical understanding
“commerce,” because it is not produced for sale, if it can show
a compelling interest in regulating the activity wherein a
failure to do so would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market in that particular good.
The Court, after being presented the facts of Raich found
the similarities between Wickard and Raich to be stunningly
similar.

Like Filburn, Raich was cultivating a commodity for

which there exists an already established interstate market,
even if the market in the case of Raich is an illegal one.
Congress, said the Court, had a clearly compelling reason for
controlling the production of home-grown and consumed wheat in
Wickard just as they do in the case of Raich.
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Not allowing the

federal government to control home-grown and consumed marijuana
under the CSA would substantially affect the price and market
conditions of the commodity.
The Court further opined that it matters not whether the
Court can determine “whether parties’ actions, taken in the
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but
only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”
Lopez, 514 U.S., at 557; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276—280 (1981);
Perez, 402 U.S., at 155—156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 299—301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 252—253 (1964).

In particular, the Court

found that the difficulties of enforcement for distinguishing
between marijuana that is home-grown and consumed and that which
is grown and consumed elsewhere, combined with concerns of the
drugs past history of falling into illicit channels, places far
too burdensome of an onus on that of the federal government and
leaves a major hole in the CSA. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).

Thus, in

enacting the CSA, Congress was acting under the auspices of the
authority granted in the Commerce Clause to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce…among the
several states.” U.S. Const., Art. I, §8.

33

While the Court may have seen this as an issue of federal
power under the Commerce Clause, many Americans saw this as a
battle over the legalization of medical marijuana.

Case Analysis: Gonzales v. Carhart (2007)

In 1973, a Texas law banned all abortions, except for those that
were necessary to save the life of the mother.

An unmarried,

pregnant woman from Texas sought an abortion but was denied as a
result of said law.

The woman’s name was Norma McCarvey, better

known as “Jane Roe,” and she successfully sued for injunctive
relief from the Texas anti-abortion law.

Citing precedent,

Justice Blackmun, in the Court’s opinion in the case of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), stated that the privacy right
affirmed in a prior case, Griswold (1965), "is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."

The Court’s opinion concluded that a “right to

privacy,” though not explicitly stated in the Constitution,
should allow a woman to make autonomous decisions for her own
body.
To be sure, the decision in Roe did not allow for abortion
under any circumstances.

With Roe came the well-known trimester

approach to the permissibility of abortions.
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A woman’s

pregnancy was to be divided into three thirteen-week periods,
thus making distinction between a wholly permissible abortion
and a constitutionally allowed control over access to abortion
more clearly defined.

In the first trimester, the only legal

obstacle between a woman and an abortion of a fetus is that the
woman consults with her physician beforehand.

In the second

trimester, states were granted the right to regulate abortions,
but only in such a way that would best ensure the health of the
woman.

An example of this might be requiring a woman have the

procedure done in a hospital rather than a clinic.

For

pregnancies in their final trimester, wherein the fetus is
considered “viable” – able to live, regardless of the necessary
medical technology, outside of the mother’s womb, the state’s
had the right to regulate and even limit abortions due to “its
interest in the potentiality of human life," except in those
situations in which the woman’s health is in danger (6).
Following the decision of the Court in Roe, state
legislators attempting to limit access to abortion passed a
number of laws.

Some of these included requirements that women

seek the approval of their spouses (Planned Parenthood Of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 [1976]), minors receive the
approval of both of their parents without any other option
(Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
[1983]), and that women listen to a state-scripted speech
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designed to deter them from having an abortion (Thornburgh v.
Amer. Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 [1986]).

All of these

requirements were struck down as unconstitutional, many of them
because they constituted what would later be called an “undue
burden” on a pregnant woman (12).
Case after case, the Court appeared to reaffirm its basic
claim that abortion, at least in some form, is protected by the
Constitution as a fundamental right of privacy.

By 2000, the

abortion procedure had seen some medical advances that would
bring before the court yet another a challenge to Roe v. Wade,
the partial birth abortion.

A partial birth abortion is a

procedure performed in the second trimester of pregnancy that
effectively kills the fetus before it is born. The procedure
involves delivering a substantial amount of a live fetus through
the cervix, including the entire head or the lower trunk of the
body from the naval, then performing any number of overt acts to
kill the fetus and remove it from the woman’s body.
Eventually, the issue made its way to the Supreme Court in
the case of Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

Leroy

Carhart, a Nebraskan physician that performed partial birth
abortions in a clinic, challenged a Nebraska law banning the
procedure on grounds that the law was unconstitutionally vague
and placed an undue burden on him and female patients seeking
abortions.

Ultimately, the Court found in favor of Carhart and
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declared the Nebraskan law unconstitutional.

This, however, was

only the beginning of the battle over partial birth abortion.
In 2006, Leroy Carhart would be before the Supreme Court
once again fighting for a woman’s right to what he referred to
as late-term abortions.

Reacting to the ruling of the Supreme

Court in Stenberg v. Carhart, Congress passed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act and it was signed into law by President Bush and
enacted on November 5, 2003. Again, Carhart challenged the
banning of the late-term procedure.

Because the act could just

as easily be applied to a different type of abortion procedure
than the one it was intended to ban, Carhart argued that the law
was unconstitutionally vague and created an “undue burden”
according to the Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

Carhart also claimed that the Act’s

lack of an exception for abortion procedures deemed necessary to
protect the mother’s health, regardless of congressional
findings of no medically compelling reason for performing the
abortion, made it unconstitutional under Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
The government, on the other hand, argued that the ban is
quite specific in its language when describing the type of
abortion procedure.

Furthermore, the government urged the Court

to decide that there is no need to include a health exception in
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the Act when Congress determines that this procedure is never
for the health of the mother.
On April 18, 2007, Justice Kennedy handed down the opinion
of the Court in a 5-4 decision that ruled the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act to be constitutional.

The Court held that a

reasonable reading of the Act leaves no question as to the type
of abortion procedure that it bans because it is very specific
about the intentional acts that must be performed by the
physician in order to be regarded as a criminal violation.
In response to the necessity of an exception for the
mother’s health, the Court held that the findings of Congress
that there is no medically necessary reason for performing this
procedure constituted just-cause for omitting a health exception
in the Act (13).

Justice Ginsburg, in a long-winded dissent,

boldly and bluntly commented on her colleagues stating that
“[t]he Court’s hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is
not concealed (14).”

Since this decision, no legitimate

challenge for medically necessary partial birth abortions
(intact D&E) has made its way to the Supreme Court.
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Case Analysis: Montejo v. Louisiana (2009)

Individual issue types will be explored more in-depth under
the results section.

It will be important, however, to have a

firm understanding of a criminal rights case, one of the
expected particularly salient issue types explained in the
research design plan, and the details of a specific case the
Supreme Court heard during the studied decade.

One of the best

illustrations of a case of this type comes to us in the form of
the case of Montejo v. Louisiana (2009).
Under suspected connection with the robbery and murder of a
Mr. Lewis Ferrari, police arrested Jesse Montejo on September 6,
Through the late evening of the 6th and the early morning

2002.

of September 7th, sheriff’s office police detectives interrogated
Montejo, who waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966).

Somewhere between his multiple stories of

what happened to Mr. Ferrari, Montejo admitted that he was
guilty of shooting and killing Mr. Ferrari.

All of the

interrogations of Montejo up to this point were videotaped.
According to Louisiana law, a 72-hour preliminary hearing
must occur, wherein the defendant is brought before a judge
within 72 hours of being arrested.

On September 10, Montejo was

brought in for this hearing and the record of the proceedings
reads as follows:
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“The defendant being charged with First Degree
Murder, Court ordered N[o] Bond set in this
matter. Further, Court ordered the Office of
Indigent Defender be appointed to represent the
defendant.”
(10)
All of this occurred without Montejo uttering anything
resembling an answer in the affirmative of whether or not he
wanted to accept the appointed counsel.

After the hearing, two

police detectives paid Montejo a visit and requested that he
assist them in their attempt to locate the murder weapon by
accompanying the two men, which Montejo had claimed he had
thrown into a lake.

Montejo’s attorneys claim that Montejo

reminded the gentleman that he had a lawyer appointed to him.
The two detectives, according to Montejo’s attorneys, should
have ended the interview at that moment, but instead they
pressed on and falsely informed Montejo that he did not, in
fact, have a lawyer appointed to him.

(Pet. App. 49a; R. 2787

(Trial Tr. March 8, 2005).
At this point, the detectives read Montejo another set of
Miranda warnings.

Following the reading of the warnings,

Montejo signed a statement saying he was voluntarily
accompanying the detectives.

Throughout the course of the car

ride to the lake, Montejo was provided a pen and paper by the
detectives and told that he should write a letter to the widow
of Mr. Ferrari in which he could express his remorse for his
actions.

At trial, Montejo testified that much of the letter’s
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content was actually dictated by one of the detectives that sat
next to him for the ride.

Though ultimately unsuccessful in

locating the murder weapon, the detectives returned Montejo to
the St. Tammany jail where they encountered Montejo’s courtappointed attorney.

Not surprisingly, the attorney was quite

perturbed by the fact that his client had been questioned
without any notice to counsel.
On October 24, 2002, Montejo was indicted on one count of
capital murder.

At trial, the letter that Montejo had written

to Mr. Ferrari’s widow was introduced.

Defense counsel

immediately objected on grounds that the letter was “procured in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.”
certiorari).

(See petition for writ of

Following a suppression hearing, the trial court

ruled against the objection of Montejo and admitted the letter
into evidence during the examination of one of the detectives.
The guilt phase of Montejo’s trial began on March 5, 2002 and
just four days later the jury found him guilty of first-degree
murder.

The next morning, the penalty phase began and was

completed before noon, with the jury returning a death sentence
for Montejo.

Of course, Montejo appealed the decision and eventually
made his way to the Supreme Court.

In the opinion of the Court,

Justice Scalia insisted on emphasizing a number of issues that
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were not in dispute in this case.

First, the Sixth Amendment

guarantees the right to counsel at all “critical” stages of
criminal proceedings (United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 227–
228 [1967]).

According to Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S.

201, 204–205 (1964), interrogation by the State is considered a
“critical” stage in the proceedings.

Justice Scalia continues

by making clear that precedent clearly allows for a waiving of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, “so long as relinquishment
of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, n. 4 (1988).

Furthermore, the

decision to wave this right does not need to be a counseled
decision. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 352–353 (1990).
And, regardless of the Miranda rights being derivative of the
Fifth Amendment, waiving one’s right is an effective means of
waiving the right to counsel being present as arranged for by
the Sixth Amendment.
The Court overturned its prior decision of Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) and did away with the case law that
held that once a person has claimed a right to counsel any
subsequent waiving of that right for police interrogation would
be invalid and any evidence collected in this way would be found
to be inadmissible in court.

Jackson was the main focus of

Montejo’s defense, as they claimed it offered protection for
Montejo, even after police made false statements regarding his
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lack of appointed counsel.

As a result of the Court’s decision,

the Louisiana Supreme Court decision was vacated and the case
remanded to trial court to re-examine the merits of Montejo’s
claim.

Essentially, the Court determined that a defendant does

not necessarily need to take extra steps to secure the
protections provided by the Sixth Amendment. 556 U.S. ___
(2009); 129 S.Ct. 2079 (11).
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Results and Findings

The data collected for statistical analysis simply looks
like a series of numbers following a list of cases, but hidden
within the numbers are trends and peculiarities that have played
a part in determining the American people’s approval of the
Court.
Exactly which variables play the largest role is
easier to pinpoint using the software program known as the
“Statistical Package for the Social Sciences,” a description of
which can be found above. First, it is important to break the
cases down into their component parts and develop a table of
this data in a format that can be analyzed with the use of SPSS.
For this, it is important to code different variables into the
table.

Coding is a term used to describe the process wherein a

certain variable, be it Senate majority or presidential party,
is transformed from a qualitative term like Republican or
Democrat into a simple 0 or 1. This coding must be done for all
of the variables until the case is nothing more than a series of
numbers that correlate to a codebook allowing the analyst to
bear in mind what each variable means.
Given the focus of the analysis, the most important
variable will be the overall change in approval rating following
a decision by the Supreme Court.
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To determine this change, the

poll most recently taken following the decision (sometimes only
a few days after [Poll_Post]) is subtracted from the poll most
recently taken before the decision (Poll_Pre).

As this analysis

understands it, the results of this simple mathematical equation
give us the change reflected as a result of each particular
decision.
For instance, the data shows that prior to the Gonzales v.
Randolph decision, the approval rating for the Supreme Court was
56 percent.

Following that decision, the nearest poll taken

indicated a 4 percent increase in the overall approval rating
for the Court, bring it up to 60 percent.

The table used for

all of the data analysis is available below.
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Table 1: Case Data Coded for the Studied Variables (Codebook Below)
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CODEBOOK
Issues:
Abortion – 1
Homosexuality – 2
Criminal Rights – 3
Civil Rights – 4
States’ Rights – 5
Commerce Clause – 6
Federal Agent – 7
Environment – 8
Immigration – 9
Free Speech – 10

President and Congress
Divided at Time of Decision
(PCDiv):
Pres R Con D – 0
Pres D Con R – 1
Not Divided R/R – 3
Not Divided D/D – 4
N/A - 5
Case Overturns Past Precedent
(OvrTrn):
No – 0
Yes - 1

Presidential Party at Time of
Decision (PresPart):
Republican – 0
Democrat – 1

Opinion Written by Appointee
of Which Party (OpAuthRD):
Republican – 0
Democrat – 1
Per Curiam – 2

Case Decided Within 1 Year
After Presidential Election
Year (PPE1y)*:
No – 0
Yes – 1

Supreme Court Public Opinion
Approval According to Gallup,
Inc.:
1-100%

Case Decided Within 6 Months
After Congressional Election
(PCE6m)*:
No – 0
Yes - 1

* - Simply following
election, not necessarily
meaning term has started yet.
If applicable, refers to
party of President-Elect.

Unanimous Decision (UnaDec):
No – 0
Yes – 1

** - Even if new term
technically has NOT started.
Designed to suggest the
political feelings of the
nation and who the people
wanted to be the majority of
our legislature.

Senate Majority Party at Time
of Decision (SenMaj):
Republican – 0
Democrat – 1
Split – 3
House Majority Party at Time
of Decision (HousMaj):
Republican – 0
Democrat – 1
Divided Congress Majority
Parties at Time of Decision
(DivCon):
No – 0
Yes – 1
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An analysis of the approval ratings after each case from
each individual year indicates that the years 2003-2005 marked a
steady decrease in public approval for the Supreme Court, as
shown in Figure 2.

The court saw its approval ratings following

major decisions fall from a high of 60 percent to a low of 42
percent during this time period.

This 42 percent approval

rating came immediately after the Gonzales v. Raich (2005)
decision, which resulted in the lowest approval rating of the
Court for the entire decade.
Furthermore, the graph shows that the approval ratings for
the Supreme Court were extremely volatile from 2003-2010. A
quick overview and subsequent references to this graph will
allow for an understanding of the change over time following
analysis of specific variables, particularly those of issue type
and year.

Figure 2: Approval Ratings Before and After Each decision and
Year
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Do Issues Play a Role?
Below is a bar graph that represents the means of the
absolute changes for issue types from the poll that most
immediately preceded the decision (Poll_Pre) to the poll that
most immediately followed the decisions (Poll_Post).

The red

bars indicate a loss in mean approval and the green represent a
gain in mean approval rating for the issue indicated beneath
each bar.

Comparing issue types throughout the decade reveals

some very intriguing data regarding approval trends from 20002010.
Criminal rights cases, which include Boumediene v. Bush
(2008) and Montejo v. Louisiana (2009), appear to be the only
issue type tha leads to a positive mean for change in approval
ratings for the court.

This tells us that over the last decade,

cases involving criminal rights had a tendency to lead to an
improvement in approval for the Supreme Court.

In fact, it

appears the avergae increase from Poll_Pre to Poll_Post is +3.4
percent following such decisions.
The exact cause of this change is difficult to pinpoint,
but there are explanations that are more plausible than others.
Perhaps the American people approve of the Court “cracking down”
on criminals and keeping our nation safe.

As crime rates seem

to be going up, the American people may find enjoyment in the
idea that criminals are no longer going to be released on a
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technicality.

It could, however, be the exact opposite.

Some

of the cases of this decade, to be sure, brought about questions
of things like the 5th Amendment right to due process and not to
self-incriminate or the 6th Amendment right to retain counsel.
It could be the case that decisions reflecting a strengthening
or weakening of these rights has a direct effect on the approval
ratings of the Court.
Figure 3: The Effect on Approval Ratings Divided By Issue
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Case Overturns Precedent (OvrTrn) –
Comparing means of the effect of a decision by different
variables allows us to observe the trends by which certain
phenomena can be explained, if any trends exist.

In the above

data, the variable of whether or not a case overturns past
precedent is coded into No – O and Yes – 1.

From the data, we

can see that during the first decade of the millennium the
average change from Poll_Pre to Poll_Post was negative for both
situations.

While there is a slight difference in the effect of

the two different characteristics, the difference is so small as
to be almost negligible.

This analysis does, however, make

clear that regardless of the decisions effect on past precedent,
the approval rating of the Court tended to decrease following
some of its most controversial decisions.

Table 2: Mean % Change When Decision
Overturns Precedent
OvrTrn

Mean

0

-1.3333

9

4.87340

1

-.5000

2

13.43503

-1.1818

11

6.09620

Total

N

52

Std. Deviation

Key:
Not Overturn – 0
Overturn - 1

Senate Majority (SenMaj) – Interestingly, an analysis of the
means for this variable shows evidence of a greater negative
change in public approval following decisions that are handed
down in times of Republican control of the Senate.

The middle

chart represents the means for all three of the possible
outcomes, and the table below shows that in times when the
Senate was controlled by Republicans a -2.6% change in public
approval occurred on average.
Table 3: Mean % Change Under Control w/ 3

Key:

Options
SenMaj

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

0

-2.6000

5

6.10737

1

-.6667

3

9.50438

3

.6667

3

3.21455

Total

-1.1818

11

6.09620

Republican – 0
Democrat – 1
Split - 3

Table 4: Mean % Change Under Party Control
SenCont

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

.00

-2.6000

5

6.10737

1.00

.0000

6

6.38749

Total

-1.1818

11

6.09620

53

Key:
Republican – 0
Not
Republican -1

Presidential Election 1 Year (PPE1y) – The data in these tables
shows us that the Supreme Court decisions handed down within one
year of the presidential election, a time often referred to as
the “honeymoon” period for newly elected presidents, results in
an average of 0 percent change from Poll_Pre to Poll_Post
following some of the decades most controversial decisions.
Conversely, decisions handed down not in this “honeymoon” period
tend to result in a mean decrease in public approval of 1.85
percent following controversial decisions.
It is important to note that throughout the decade, there
were only 4 cases that were decided within one year of the
presidential election.

Also, an analysis of this variable

controlling for the party of the president (PresPart) indicates
that this variable maintains the same significance in regards to
the effect of change in public approval.

Table 5: Mean % Change Within 1 Year After Presidential
Election
PPE1y

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

0

-1.8571

7

5.52052

1

.0000

4

7.74597

-1.1818

11

6.09620

Total

54

Key:
Not w/in 1 Year - 0
W/in 1 Year - 1

Post Congressional Election 6 Months (PCE6m) –
The difference in public approval change for those
decisions handed down within the first 6 months of a
congressional election, which happens every two years, resulted
in an average increase of 3 percent for the Court.
Interestingly enough, beyond the cutoff point of 6 months, the
data reveals an average -2.75 percent change in approval rating
following the Court’s decisions.

The difference between the

first 6 months and any time beyond that threshold equates to a
stunning 5.75 percent.

This variable, it seems, results in much

larger differences than, say, that of being within one year of a
presidential election.

Much of this could be a simple

coincidental result for this decade, but there certainly could
be some really intriguing reasoning for this result that would
require much more than a statistical analysis.
Table 6: Within 6 Months Post Congressional
Election
PCE6m

Mean

0

-2.7500

8

5.70088

1

3.0000

3

6.00000

-1.1818

11

6.09620

Total

N

55

Std. Deviation

Key:
Not w/in 6 Months – 0
W/in 6 Months - 1

Criminal Rights Issue (Issue3) – The tables below show the
strongest predictor of all the variables available in the
analysis.

Issue3 represents the issue type of criminal rights.

According to the data, simply knowing that the issue that the
decision involved was criminal rights tells us something around
51 percent of the outcome regarding change from Poll_Pre to
Poll_Post.

The other issues, when analyzed separately, were not

statistically significant in revealing any intriguing data about
their impact on the effect of the decisions.

Table 7: Criminal Rights as a Predictor

Model

R

1

.720

R Square

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

(Predicatability)

Square

Estimate

a

.518

.464

4.46219

a. Predictors: (Constant), Issue3

Table 8: Mean Change for Criminal Rights Issue
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients

Coefficients

B (Mean %
Model
1

Change)
Criminal

Std. Error

3.400

1.996

-8.400

2.702

t

Beta

Sig.

1.704

.123

-3.109

.013

Rights
Issues
Not Criminal
Rights Issue
a. Dependent Variable: Effect
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-.720

CONCLUSION

By now, our question has long been answered.

Did the

Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore really have the effect of
destroying the Court’s approval rating?
a very apparent no.

The answer seems to be

Much of this can be concluded from a simple

analysis of the larger changes in public approval from the same
decade.

As mentioned, following the decision of Gonzales v.

Raich (2005), the Court saw a change of -9 percent in its
overall rating.
An analysis of the change in public approval throughout the
decade indicates that the year or term that the poll occurred
after played a role in the effect of the decision.

As was made

obvious in the representation in Figure 2, which shows an
extremely volatile return of approval ratings for the Court from
2005-2009.

It is also important to note that the cases

highlighted with a more in-depth analysis (Raich (2005); Carhart
(2007); and Montejo (2009)) were all cases that showcased an
extreme change in public approval for the Court during the
studied decade.

These cases were explained in more detail to

further explicate the types of issues that lead to a major
change in public approval for the Court.

Also, of the chosen

cases, only 3 of them resulted in a change of public approval
outside the margin of error as concluded by Gallup, Inc. Not
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coincidentally, those three cases were highlighted above in the
Case Analysis section.
The exact reason for this volatility is not apparent from
the data collected for this analysis.

Indeed, it may be

completely impossible to make claims of exactly what causes such
erratic responses from respondents.

An analysis of specific

variables, though, does offer some insight into this question.
It seems Republicans controlling the Senate when the Court
hands down certain decisions appears to play a role in
determining the effect of the decision on the Court’s public
approval rating.

From the data, we can clearly see that,

following those decisions that were handed down during times of
Republican control of the Senate, the approval ratings for the
Court saw an average decrease of 2.6 percent.

Following those

decisions that were handed down in any time other than that
which the Republicans controlled the Senate, the data indicates
that there is no difference in public approval rating from
Poll_Pre to Poll_Post.

For the Supreme Court’s sake, it might

be best to keep those Republicans from controlling the Congress.
It is also very interesting to note that 2 of the 3 major
changes in public approval that were highlighted by further case
analysis were also cases that had their decisions handed down
during times of Republican control of the Senate.
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This may lead

us to believe that a Republican controlled Senate leads to major
dives in public approval ratings for the Supreme Court.
If a case overturns past precedent, we observed that the
mean effect of such a decision is actually less likely to bring
down public approval than if the case did nothing to overrule
past precedent.

Conventional wisdom would have many of us

believe that the Court overruling past decisions, thus
potentially making the laws applications even more ambiguous,
would lead to a greater change in public approval than cases
which leave the past precedent untouched.

An appeal to the

doctrine of Stare Decisis would seem to make this very claim.
This, however, is not the case, and although the difference
between the effects of such circumstances may be small
quantitatively, it still brings up an interesting challenge to
the idea that consistency in the Court is important.
In line with the hypothesis, whether or not a decision was
handed down within the “honeymoon” period of a new presidency
appears to have played a role in the mean effect of decisions in
the studied decade.

More precisely, those decisions handed down

within one year of a presidential election saw on average no
change from Poll_Pre to Poll_Post.

Those decisions handed down

after this period saw a -1.85 percent decrease in public
approval on average following each of these decisions.

This

appears to correlate with a time that is normally associated
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with high approval for the president as well.

Perhaps the

Courts are subject to similar treatment when there is a new
president.
One of the largest differences in the mean change in public
approval stems from the decision being handed down within 6
months of a congressional election.

Much like the honeymoon

period for the president, a period of heightened positivity on
the part of the American people was expected to accompany the
ushering in of some fresh faces into Congress, as well as the
continuation of the careers of some of the more well liked
representatives and senators.

In quantitative terms, the

Supreme Court saw its approval ratings rise an average of 3
percent following those decisions handed down within 6 months of
congressional elections, which are held every two years.

This 3

percent mean increase is a 5.75 percent higher mean change than
what we observe following decisions that are handed down after
the 6 month honeymoon period.

Those decisions handed down after

this period resulted in a mean change of -2.75 percent overall
throughout the decade.
As was suspected, the most important variable for effecting
change in public approval rating was the issues variable.
Whether or not the Court’s decision dealt with some particularly
controversial issues played a major role in determining the
change in approval for the Court.
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As Figure 3 indicates, a case

dealing with abortion, the Commerce Clause, or criminal rights
played a major role in the mean change in public approval of the
Court for the first decade of the new millennium.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it would appear that the
Bush decision had a relatively small effect on the overall
feelings of the American people toward their highest court.
Furthermore, it seems an appeal to issues played a much larger
part in determining the change in overall effect than any of the
other variables studied in this analysis.

For further analysis

of this topic, it will be extremely important to keep in mind
that a number of the variables analyzed saw a change in public
approval that is worth noting including Senate majority,
overturning of precedent, and “honeymoon” periods.
All of this data may be useful for future determination of
change in public approval ratings for the Court.

For instance,

one may be able to observe whether or not the case is likely to
overturn past precedent and make an appeal to the type of issue
the case handles in conjunction with which party controls the
Senate at the suspected time of decision to make statistically
reliable assumptions about future trends regarding public
approval of the Supreme Court.

Of course, the more cases and

dates included in the analysis, the stronger and stronger the
ability to predict such changes becomes, but this analysis does
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offer an overview of the last decade in the history of public
approval of the United States Supreme Court.
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